From among the many philosophies that have ever existed, the best versions may be considered the philosophies that exert their effect on human conduct. Philosophy for the sake of philosophy itself may be edifying and sublime, like the highest of the arts, but if philosophy does not move us toward ameliorative action in order to become better human beings who make their world better, it ends up as a luxurious "language game" or "intellectual gymnastics" that we can no longer afford. Of course, action without wisdom is stupid, even disastrous. If the mission of philosophy is to bring wisdom into action, and if there is any wisdom in philosophy at all, this wisdom will be active and it will teach us how to live and how to act.
INTRODUCTORY: THE GLOBAL POTENTIAL OF PRAGMATISM EMIL VIŠŇOVSKÝ
From among the many philosophies that have ever existed, the best versions may be considered the philosophies that exert their effect on human conduct. Philosophy for the sake of philosophy itself may be edifying and sublime, like the highest of the arts, but if philosophy does not move us toward ameliorative action in order to become better human beings who make their world better, it ends up as a luxurious "language game" or "intellectual gymnastics" that we can no longer afford. Of course, action without wisdom is stupid, even disastrous. If the mission of philosophy is to bring wisdom into action, and if there is any wisdom in philosophy at all, this wisdom will be active and it will teach us how to live and how to act.
The philosophy known as pragmatism, including both its versions: classical pragmatism and neo-pragmatism, perhaps surprisingly, offers us a wealth of ideas that can help us to solve the problems of our current global predicament as well as to help us answer the crucial questions of how to live and what to do. Pragmatism in the contemporary world is a unique philosophy, which has both preserved and amassed valuable ideas with the potential to influence the lives of men and women, as well as to provide a reconstructive and transformative impact on all spheres of human life and action. Pragmatism is a transformational, anti-dogmatic and creative philosophy. Its key feature is an approach (or a method) rather than a doctrine (or a fixed body of ideas) to be endorsed by philosophers and non-philosophers. On the other hand, pragmatism is by no means an opportunistic or wildly relativistic, un-principled philosophy without norms, values and principles. Pragmatism cherishes its own norms, values, and principles, and it has its own set of ideas. It also has its own broad vision of the world, which is very pertaining to the current global situation.
Philosophy for pragmatists is a tool, but a cherished tool to be employed in an intelligent reconstruction of all walks of human experience. The global purpose of this philosophy is to provide inspiration so as to develop and integrate our efforts in creative intelligence.
In pragmatist philosophy we can discern a world-vision that includes, among others, the idea of interdependence. Let me briefly outline this idea. It draws basically on the following sources: 1. Peirce's agapistic metaphysics, 2. James's pluralistic ontology, 3. Dewey's transactionism, 4. Rorty's panrelationalism.
1. Classical pragmatism is an advocate of metaphysics as the study of "most general features of reality and real objects" (Peirce 1998, 2, 375) . This is Ch. S. Peirce's notion according to which "Every man of us has a metaphysics, and has to have one; and it will influence his life HUMAN AFFAIRS 19, 1-9, 2009 DOI: 10.2478 greatly" (Peirce 1931 (Peirce -1958 . His project was to base metaphysics on science and to make it scientific. In metaphysics we deal with the same reality we encounter empirically and observe in phenomenological and normative sciences. But the objects of metaphysics are not only most common, they are also least noticeable, abstract and unseen, transcending the actual experience, but, nonetheless, real. We come to these objects through our reasoning guided by logic. One part of Peirce's metaphysics is cosmology dealing with most general features of the universe as a whole. His is evolutionary cosmology inspired mostly by Darwin but also substantially distinct from Darwin's. The trajectory of the evolution of the universe is its development from chaos to order, from pure chance and irregularity to lawfulness and regularity; from pure possibility, spontaneity and potentiality to determinateness, rule-following and self-control. Behind all of this is the "effete mind" or a spirit whose vehicle is habits. All entities in nature move from a disordered to an ordered state via habits, which represent some necessary fixtures. The universe has a tendency to be guided by rules and laws, but it is far from an absolute tendency. Peirce described this tendency in his synechism: the doctrine of continuity when things fall under the same law. However, natural laws are not absolute, invariate, they are derivative and approximate. They still allow a space for chance and spontaneity (tychism). Tychism stresses spontaneity, while synechism stresses orderliness. There is a tension between these two fundamental features of the universe that is balanced by agapism-the doctrine of evolutionary and creative love. Agape (love) is a unique causal force, a positive power of sympathy, a creative law of association rather than something fortuitous or mechanistic.
Peirce's metaphysics is not just a purely theoretical conception-it is linked to his religious, and even ethical and social views. An ethical meaning consists in the deliberate cultivation of self-control as the highest stage of evolution, which includes "the surrender of our finite selves to an infinite ideal" (Peirce 1931 (Peirce -1958 8, 262) . According to Peirce's metaphysics, interdependence in the universe grows with the evolution from spontaneity to lawfulness. However, this is never an absolute necessity since there is always a space for spontaneity, and love is that particular power that balances all in harmony.
2. Classical pragmatism is an advocate of a throughout pluralism including metaphysical pluralism as a radical-empiricist conception of reality according to which we live in a "pluralistic universe". The locus classicus of this conception is the work of W. James. For instance, in the chapter from Pragmatism (1907) titled "The One and the Many" he opposes traditional philosophical monism, determinism and absolutism, and explains that in pragmatist terms "the oneness and the manyness" are "co-ordinate", that is, the world is the one and the many at the same time because everything that exists is influenced in some way by something else…, and in general, it may be said that all things cohere and adhere to each other somehow, and that the universe exists practically in reticulated or concatenated forms which make of it a continuous and "integrated" affair (James 1981, 68 ).
Here we have the concept of universal interdependence, or of a network, that might remind us of Hegelian dialectics, but James's focus is on the practical, i. e. experiential side, which includes both relations and objects. In his ontology, as well as epistemology, there is no division between "objective" and "subjective", only between "disjunctive" and "conjunctive" relations. Experience and world are "one" (united), but pluralistic (diverse, multiple) at the same time, i.e. composed of a variety of interrelated parts, of which we humans are one. In our stream of life experience we are intimately embedded in reality (united with it), and only upon reflection do we differentiate these parts and their interrelations. Reflected experience teaches us that the world not only demands us to act, but is also open to a multitude of our projects. Thus, James's ontology as a theoretical conception is also linked to his religious, and even ethical and social views.
James's pluralism should not be confused with any kind of subjectivism and/or relativism of an "anything goes" type. The pluralistic universe of multitude interdependences is no "solid block"; rather it is an open, incomplete, imperfect universe that is, of course, risky, dangerous, uncertain, insecure, "tangled, muddy, painful and perplexed". But on the other hand it is sufficiently "plastic" to allow humans to intervene and implement their intentions. This is also by no means an arbitrary affair. One of the features James was very sensitive about is an understanding of and respect for others. A plurality of different lifestyles and viewpoints is manifest, therefore, all of us should overcome what he called a "certain blindness in human beings" toward understanding the lives of others. Despite all the disparities, James's philosophy does not break up into atomistic conception. For instance, he invokes the concept of sociality based on the ancient understanding of "socius" meaning an ally, partner or family member. In Pluralistic Universe he wrote that "the common socius of us all is the great universe whose children we are" (James 1971, 137) . In his understanding, multiple varieties demand rather than preclude reciprocal relations and cooperation, notwithstanding how hard this might be.
James was very sensitive to making this world a harmonious home of humanity. Even if he was well aware that there is no guarantee that we will succeed, the "will to believe" and "strenuous mood" provided invincible support to his meliorism.
3. Classical pragmatism is an advocate of metaphysical interactionism as the conception of the world in which all entities inter-act, either directly and mutually, or indirectly and mediately. In social pragmatism the main proponent of this conception is George Herbert Mead, but I wish to focus here on J. Dewey and his version of it called "transactionism".
Dewey's better term for interdependence was not simply interaction, but "transaction". He employed this term in various contexts from bio-psychological to sociological to educational. Transaction in general is a complex inter-active experiential exchange that occurs between an organism and its environment, mind and world, individual and society. All action is transaction. In Experience and Education (1938) , he provided the following definition: "An experience is always what it is because of a transaction between an individual and what, at the time, constitutes his environment…" (Dewey 1988, LW 13:25) . In Knowing and the Known (1949) , he wrote of transaction as functional interdependence (Dewey 1989, LW 16) . Transaction is a twoway process that always involves a certain mechanism of correlation and coordination.
But Dewey also explicitly employed the term "interdependence" as an essential part of his modern vision of the world as a correlated (coordinated) order. For instance, in his early work on Leibniz, he noted that "the law of the universe is interdependence". Later he mentioned that the Ancient idea of "the complete interdependence of all things according to universal and necessary law" is an idea which is "the basis of natural science" (Dewey 1984, LW 5:63) . He observed that wherever there is diversity, a multitude of different aspects, there must also be interdependence as a "vital fact" so that an organic unity or a wholeness could be maintained, be it in nature or culture, in mental or social life (in The School and Society he employed the term "organic interdependence"). Interdependence, basically, consists in causal and functional interrelations; it is dynamic and processual, not static and rigid. It functions not merely to preserve the thing and its status; it is also indispensable for change. "There is, then, a genuine sense in which the evolution of life, the increase in diversity and interdependence of life functions, means an evolution of new environments just as truly as of new organs" (Dewey 1978, MW 6:438) . In Dewey's social theory, interdependence between individual and society is both a fact and a value; it involves "a reciprocal influence of each on the other" as opposed to "those who would assert individuals independent of society or society independent of psychical individuals" (Dewey 1972, EW 5:388-389) . Social inclusion, solidarity and public participation are further manifestations of conscious interdependence. "The interdependence of modern men" in industry and work and "greater interdependence of life in cities", he observed in his Ethics (1908) , are necessities and signs of growing western civilization. Well-being in society is imposible without "the interdependence of interests" (Dewey 1979, MW 8: 353) .
Nothing in the world and society is purely exclusive, isolated or separated according to Dewey. Every type of relations of man to man, political, friendly, kindred, are developed forms of the interdependence implicit in the early group life. A group of units, each independent of the others, would represent mass only, but such a group as is made up of men, women, and children, sustaining all the relations found in present human life, represents something vastly more than a mass of individuals. Every life draws from the rest. Man without friendship, love, pity, sympathy, communication, cooperation, justice, rights, or duties, would be deprived of nearly all that gives life its value (Dewey 1978, MW 5:439) .
From an ethical point of view, the formation of close and mutual interdependence is one of the ancient social mechanisms in habituation to human associations. On the other hand, with modern individualism and toleration, the process of liberation "from interdependence with kinship, economic, and political association, religion has an opportunity to become more personal and more universal".
Thus, Dewey was well aware of both sides of the story: interdependence was not necessarily a positive, but rather a complex fact.
It is a commonplace that steam and electricity have made the nations of the world increasingly interdependent. They have drawn the peoples of the earth, for weal and for woe, closely together. Interdependence is a condition of many things better than those which mankind has achieved in the past. But interdependence in and of itself is not necessarily a good (Dewey, LW 3:348) .
In Ethics he observed:
The increased interdependence of men, through travel and transportation, collective methods of production, and crowding of population in cities, has widened the area of the harm likely to result from inconsiderate action, and has strengthened the belief that adequate thoughtfulness is possible only where there is sympathetic interest in others (Dewey 1978, MW 5:416) .
Though the industrial era has brought more dangerous vices in the form of extreme specialization and the division of labor, these tendencies were also worrying for Dewey:
The ever-increasing interdependence of peoples in every phase of modern life does not automatically bring understanding, amity and cooperation of the interdependent elements. As the state of the world proves, it may produce tensions and frictions, and these may lead each element to try at once to withdraw into itself and to establish peace and unity by forceful conquest of opposing elements (Dewey 1979, MW 8:445 ).
Dewey took philosophy as the critical reflection of the era. He was such a brilliant observer of social life and development, even in the international arena, that for him globalization would not have been such a surprise, even not a new fact, just the prolongation of tendencies he had observed during his lifetime. Consider for example the following claim:
Modern conditions of production and exchange of commodities have made the whole world one to a degree never approximated before. A war today may close banks and paralyze trade in places thousands of miles away from the scene of action. This is only a coarse and sensational manifestation of an interdependence which is quietly and persistently operating in the activity of every farmer, manufacturer, laborer, and merchant, in every part of the civilized globe (Dewey 1979, MW 8:361-2) .
And, as the philosopher of education, he readily applied his reflection to school instruction:
Consequently there is a demand which never existed before that all the items of school instruction shall be seen and appreciated in their bearing upon the network of social activities which bind people together. When men lived in small groups which had little to do with each other, the harm done by an education which pursued exclusively intellectual and theoretic aims was comparatively slight. Knowledge might be isolated because men were isolated. But to-day the accumulation of information, just as information, apart from its social bearings, is worse than futile (Dewey 1979, MW 8:362) .
There is much much more to Dewey's ideas on interdependence with their relevance to current globality, but I think no further evidence and quotation is needed here. Just the sketch of his vision:
Conflict of national interests instead of harmonious interdependence; the development of the isolated irresponsible territorial national state with predatory and imperialistic habits, aiming at control of labor and raw materials of backward countries, and seeking foreign markets, with protective tariffs at home--as against the prophecies of international harmony and growth of cosmopolitanism (Dewey 1983, MW 15:258) .
Contemporary neo-pragmatism
, as opposed to all versions of classical pragmatism, is the advocate of the anti-metaphysical approach according to which there is no "way things really are" and "the appearance-reality distinctions" are to be replaced "by that between descriptions of the world and of ourselves which are less useful and those which are more useful" (Rorty 1999, 27) . The champion of this philosophical stance is R. Rorty. However, he also developed a broad substantial or fundamental vision of reality, which he himself dubbed as "panrelationalism" (ibid., 52). He explained that "there is nothing to be known about anything save what is stated in sentences describing it," and "there is nothing to be known about anything save its relations to other things" (ibid., 54). With respect to any real thing, this approach suggests that there is no "intrinsic essence" or "objective nature" to it apart from our descriptions or interpretations in terms of relations. He saw "every thing as simply a nexus of relations" (Rorty in Balslev 1999, 39) .
The same applies to globalization. It can be understood as a complex outcome of a totality of social practices, both non-linguistic and linguistic, non-intentional and intentional ones, rather than a predestined trajectory of human history. There can be no one absolute description of what globalization is. A plurality of conceptions has arisen, all of which take part in the "conversation of mankind."
Rorty's pragmatism is "visionary", "romantic", even "utopian". He himself has provided a sketchy outline of several rather dim aspects of globalization. First, he joined Marxists in the worries about economic consequences such as "immiseration and levelling of wage rates produced by the globalization of the capital and labor market." He considered "the central fact of globalization" to be "the economic situation of the citizens of a nation-state has passed beyond the control of the laws of that state." Second, he saw as the "underlying political problem: the emergence of a global class of superrich." He was scared by the "absence of a global polity", which "means that the superrich can operate without any thought of any interests save their own." Such global economic and political trends seriously endanger democracy. Third, his proposal for the remedy of these ailments is a"global egalitarian utopia" and "a just global society", which "only global political institutions" could bring about. "Achieving liberal utopia on a global scale would require the establishment of a world federation, exercising a global monopoly of force…" (Rorty 1999, 274) . He described his global utopia as follows: …in a just global society, not only would all children have roughly equal chances, but girls would have the same sort of chances as boys. In that society, nobody will care about which sex you fall in love with, any more than about the lightness or darkness of your skin. In that society, people who want to think of themselves as Basque first, or black first, or women first, and citizens of their countries or of a global cooperative commonwealth second, will have little trouble doing so. For the institutions of that commonwealth will be regulated by John Start Mill's dictum that everybody gets to do what they like as long as it does not interfere with other people's doing the same". However, fourth, he critically scrutinized intellectuals for their "loss of faith and hope" and "inability to construct a plausible narrative of progress (ibid., 235).
Nonetheless, he considered that what is "distinctive about pragmatism" is that it "substitutes the notion of a better human future for the notions of "reality", "reason" and "nature"" (ibid., 27). Any kind of imagination which can open up to us "the possibilities of a utopian global future", is crucial. A different world is at least conceivable. He preferred "to speak of the practical need of the members of an interdependent global society to get in touch with each other…" (Rorty in Balslev 1999, 40) .
For Rorty, there is no absolute interdependence; humanity is dependent on its own social practices and interrelations within and without rather than on something "superhuman". He referred to Dewey's point that the only kind of dependence humans need is the self-image as the part of the broader context. Despite being sceptical on a couple of points, Rorty placed hope in "the power of human beings to change the conditions of human life", in "humanity's ability to take charge of its own affairs" (Rorty 1999, 264) . As a pragmatist he urged us "to make a global community more attainable" (Rorty in Balslev 1999, 89) , even if he doubted (strangely, needless to say) that his philosophy has much to offer. His hope for the better future of humanity was anti-foundational. In one of his last published works he expressed it as follows:
My sense of the holy, insofar as I have one, is bound up with the hope that someday, any millennium now, my remote descendents will live in a global civilization in which love is pretty much the only law. In such a society, communication would be domination-free, class and caste would be unknown, hierarchy would be a matter of temporary pragmatic convenience, and power would be entirely at the disposal of the free agreement of a literate and well-educated electorate (Rorty 2005, 40) . Thus, summing up, which pragmatist ideas for globality might we consider useful? From Pierce: ideas of love, creativity, harmony. From James: ideas of an open universe and respect for others. From Dewey: ideas of responsible social correlation and coordination. From Rorty: ideas of imagination and solidarity.
We live in one world of multiple interdependencies. Such is the metaphysical message of pragmatism. The political and ethical message that can be derived from it is the following: mutual respect and responsible cooperation on the global level. * * * The collection of papers contributed to the symposium of the present issue on the place of pragmatist philosophy in the contemporary world exposes both the theoretical and practical potential of pragmatist philosophy in various ways. All the contributions in some way show that pragmatism is an open-ended, transformative and humanistic philosophy. Michael Eldridge makes his point by way of the opening discussion of ever-lively questions such as "What is pragmatism as philosophy?" or "How many pragmatisms are there?" Eldridge's distinction between "adjectival" and "generic" pragmatisms allows him to identify not only plurality but also some sort of unity, or at least continuity, for that matter, within pragmatist philosophy. According to his debate, the focus on human practices and their intelligent re-constructions might seem to be the possible identifier of every kind of generic pragmatism. Mostly on the theoretical (and abstract epistemological) level Scott Aikin writes about the well-known pragmatist rejection of the "myth of the Given". He argues that this rejection, as developed by W. Sellars and his followers, notably R. Rorty, is mistaken, since there is a place for "pragmatist Givenism" as outlined by C. I. Lewis and likewise Dewey's theory of experience.
In contrast to those two papers summarized above, the authors of the next three papers turn to more concrete issues and demonstrate the practical and ethical potential of pragmatism. Don Morse throws a challenge to all kinds of oppression caused by theoretical abstractionism or political anarchism in defending pragmatism as the philosophy of concrete life, live experience and intelligent social practice. In Morse's explication, pragmatism emerges as vital philosophical anthropology and a "philosophy of life", which is a dimension that still needs much to be fostered within it. No less, perhaps even greater humanistic potential of pragmatism lurks in the version of ethics of care as proponed by Jim Garrison in his article. Simply put, this potential lies in "reciprocal, caring and creative relationships" that are "ontologically basic" and socially fundamental. The conception of "pragmatist perfectionism" as suggested by Carlos Mougán, not only as an ethical but also as a political conception, may serve as another promising example of the further transformative potential of pragmatism.
The section of papers devoted to contemporary neopragmatism is engaged, not surprisingly, mostly in various interpretations of R. Rorty's legacy. Miklós Nyírö provides a sympathetic, though not unreflective, reading of Rorty's views on democratic politics, literary culture and the role of philosophy. He defends his romanticism as the vital source of his "cultural politics". Such a sympathetic reading of Rorty finds its continuation in the article contributed by Alexander Kremer, who also focuses on the main and well-known characteristics of Rorty's politics and his ideas on science and religion. Last but not least, Rorty's notion of hope is the focus of reflections developed by Mark Sanders, who takes it as a promising notion for bridging unfortunate Rortyan dichotomies between private/public and philosophy/politics. How Rorty's neopragmatism may even inspire some political visions of cultural liberation is outlined in the paper authored by Amaechi Udefi. The analytic and critical stance toward Rorty's legacy is represented in the volume by Timo Vuorio, who considers Rorty's distinctions between normative/descriptive and private/public as "two dogmas"-perhaps too strongly since speaking of "dogmas" within an open-ended spirit of pragmatist philosophy is contradiction in subjecto.
The neopragmatist defence of the idea of interdisciplinarity is provided by Wojciech Małecki in his critical approach to S. Fish's views on the subject. The volume concludes with the timely book-review essay of Sami Pihlström of one of the host of recent publications, which explain, elaborate and refine the many-faceted potential of the philosophy of pragmatism in and for the contemporary world.
1
